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VOODOO BELIEVERS: SOME SOCIOLOGICAL INSIGHT
Michele Wilson, University of Alabama in Birmingham, Birmingham, Alabama
Introduction
Sociology has attempted to affect the therapeutic community in two ways. The
first of these consists of our criticisma of both theory and practice because of
the degree to which these do not fit the known epidemiology of phenomena known
variously as mental illness and personal problems. The second attempt to
influence has come from the philosophical stance of sociology: recognition of the
relativity of realities. Although this paper addresses the second of these
sources of influence, a few comments about the former first need to be made be-
cause of its effect on the latter.
Background
Sociology, and increasingly, psychology and social work, have come to
concentrate on the distribution of events. This is an attempt to overcome the
criticisms most frequently aimed at applied fields such as psychoanalysis, clinical
psychology, counseling, and social work. The first of these criticisms is the
tendency to ignore complexity in favor of a single cause explanation--usually
psychogenic not environmental. Second, inconsistency in prediction, identification
and cure has been noted. The third points to the reason for making the first and
second criticisms, i.e., clinical research does not meet the minimal standards
required by the scientific method.
Each of the named criticisms stems from a lack of attention to the distributior
of events. An obvious first step in understanding the nature and cause of behavior
or mental states would be to check for patterns, i.e., are there consistencies in
the kinds of people who have more experiences of a type. For example, that women,
Blacks, and the poor have higher official rates may be a clue to understanding
that which we call mental illness. The logical demand then is that one must be
able to account for patterning; explanation needs to take into account any
distinctive differences in rates of occurrence. There appear to be two probable
models of explanation which would take epidemiology into account and remain with-
in the deterministic framework of sciences. The first would assume that a
particular category of persons with rates of, for instance, mental illness higher
than the rates of other categories experiences more of the cause. The second
model posits that gatekeepers are more willing to label certain kinds of people
mentally ill. The first of these assumes that there are variations in stress,
learning, opportunity, self concept and so on which result in rate differences.
The second assumes that the standards or perceptions of agents of control tend
them to interpret certain kinds of people in a way resulting in a higher incidence
of the phenomenon in question. It is likely that these explanatory models are
not mutually exclusive, rather, both life experience and labeling practices are
not randomly distributed. Because the focus of most literature has been on
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etiology or cause of the behavior rather than the diagnostic decisions made, we
will leave the former and concentrate on the latter. This interpretive or label-
ing model of explanation rests on the assumption that humans are not passive
observers, rather, they take an active part in the outcome of interaction, largely
by imposing interpretations as a basis for action (Blumer, 1969).
The Interpretive Model
There is a possibility that all fields of the social and behavioral sciences
need to go back to their philosophical roots and examine basic assumptions. From
a philosophical point of view, one of the few truths is that truth is relative.
Cultural and moral relativity is one of the most important principles in the social
sciences. This principle is taken from the more extensive concept of a socially
constructed reality (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). This refers to the idea that
there is no such thing as a single objective definition of reality. There are
only various and sometimes competing realities each of which is defined by a
different group. It is obvious, even to laypersons, that the same empirical data
can be used to support a variety of conceptions of reality--physical as well as
social. What we do is to impose a pattern (or meaning) on "facts" (events, etc.)
which in and of themselves, have no meaning. We continue to believe (a subjective
phenomenon) that something is real, in an objective appearing sense, because the
people we know believe so. In other words, there is some degree of consensus.
Consensual validation is the sociological jargon for this. In addition, we hold
on to beliefs, which may not be true, because they work, i.e., they make the world
explainable and predictable. As long as the theory or definition of reality works
and is supported by significant others, we will regard it as true.
Whether or not consensual reality is true in some objective sense does not
really matter. To paraphrase W. I. Thomas (1937:42), whatever people believe to
be real will be real in its consequences. When I see something, I must interpret
it, give it meaning. If one believes in witches, they behave as though witches
exist: they take protective measures, explain events in terms of witchcraft, and
might even execute witches. Nonbelievers, on the other hand, may choose to execute
witches because of their presumed heresy or to institutionalize them because they
are crazy. Consensual reality, therefore, is extremely important socially and
psychologically because it is the only operative reality that most people have.
That is, most of us believe and act upon whatever we have learned to be true.
That is what is meant by a social definition of reality. Like any social
definition, consensual reality varies by time and place. The case examined here,
voodoo, presents an interesting epistemological question: what happens when the
realities of therapist or representative of a social agency and client differ?
It is assumed that the interpretive or labeling model may account for the outcome.
Voodoo in a Deep-South City
The study is part of ongoing research. As is frequently the case, it began
serendipitously. The author is a rape counselor as well as sociologist. In the
course of counseling rape victims, she ran across a number of instances in which
voodoo was mentioned as central or peripheral to the rape. From some of the rape
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victims, it became apparent that they had encountered difficulties in dealing with
police and hospital personnel because of their beliefs. Initial interviews with
people in some official position such as nurse or psychiatric social worker lent
credence to the victims' observations that officials did not believe in voodoo and
further, felt that believers were "weird" or in some other way not in touch with
reality. As a consequence, most believers do not reveal the nature of their view
of the world to outsiders (Webb, 1971). Further examination of a variety of
believers and nonbelievers uncovered more specific patterns.
Researchers of voodoo have treated it in various ways including as an
alternative medical system (Snow, 1974; Webb, 1971), a religion (Williams, 1979),
and a subculture (Benyon, 1938; Snow, 1973). The inclusiveness of the concept of
subculture seems to come closer to the adherents' beliefs than the other two
which, logically could be subsumed under the more general.
Believers in voodoo in the area studied are not equally committed to or
knowledgeable about the belief system. Variation runs from knowing that one can
be hexed, that there are voodoo men, use of phrases, to the use of complex rituals
and life involvement. All shades of voodoo systems take a deterministic stance;
there is cause and effect with the source in the supernatural. Further, the
system is based on the belief that humans, with certain skills or determination,
can influence events over which the supernatural has control. Thus, birth, death,
sickness, falling in love, jealousy, and success can all be seen as part of an
order amenable to influence.
Because of this context, voodoo believers can use voodoo as a means of
determining events. Mary, a relatively young mother, knew that her husband had
become an active participant in voodoo rituals and somewhat of a pupil of a local
voodoo practitioner. His new interest became the source of much dissension
between them. Jack insisted that Mary, too, become involved; but she held to her
disbelief. His attempts at dominating her became more frequent and insistent.
All of this time, Jack's public presentation of self was that of a traditional
young man and good husband. As is so often the case, the bonds of loyalty kept
Mary quiet about what was happening in their home. In addition, she felt that
Jack's conventional appearance and behavior would make others think that she lied.
While cleaning out a closet, Mary found a shoe box containing a "voodoo doll" with
pins stuck in it. The doll, with bits of Mary's hair sprinkled with salt, was
wrapped in her underwear. Almost immediately Mary left her husband and children.
She reasoned that if he was crazy enough to do "that", then he was crazy enough to
kill her outright. She did not fear for the lives of her sons, but did plan to
get custody of them as soon as she found a job. Jack's exact intentions are un-
known, but it is clear that he was attempting to do something to Mary or that he
wanted something to happen to her. The ritual use of the doll indicates that he
tried to cause illness or death. In anthropological literature there is
documentation of death by voodoo (Cannon, 1942; Lester, 1972; Clune, 1973; Lex,
1974), thus, there is clear indication of an effective reliance upon voodoo for
causing certain outcomes. Thus, the most general parameter of voodoo is validated
by proof of the senses (ritual causes death), ancedotes of what has happened to
others, and consensual reality--the bulk of the evidence to which one is exposed
tends to a certain conclusion: it works.
A more specific example of how voodoo "works" for insiders is to note that it
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can be used as an explanatory framework of an unusual event. Yvonne, a college
student with a young child, was having all kinds of interpersonal difficulties
including an ex-boyfriend who kept shooting at her. She was in college against
the wishes of her parents who thought she should find a good man and stay home
where she belonged. They thought that if Yvonne did not straighten up that their
granddaughter should come to live with them. The conflict between Yvonne and her
parents escalated into overt hostility and they began using voodoo to manipulate
her. For instance, inside her locked apartment some spirit had poured soap powder
on the floor. Footprints were in the middle of the powder but not on the edges.
Her car had been moved from one parking space to another. She finally became
convinced that her parents would try to kill her through voodoo if she did not
acquiesce. She was able to make sense of unusual events by explaining them as the
result of voodoo.
Another instance in which meaning of events was established through the voodoo
perspective involved Tweetie, a woman in her 60's, who had been brought to the
emergency room by the police. She was, for the third time, a victim of forced
cunnilingus perpetrated by her neighbor who was known to have gone to Sister Landor
(a palmist, a Christian preacher with a radio show, and a voodoo leader) and bought
powers. Tweetie didn't blame Sister Landor-who, after all, had to make a living-
rather she blamed the man for misusing the powers to harass and attack her. He was
able to get into her locked house and to commit mischief such as stealing money
and spilling milk. When he abused her physically, he appeared as a spirit. This
vague shadow either forced her to drink a drug or otherwise rendered her motion-
less: she had no control. She was very aware that the police and nurses did not
believe her but would not deviate from her explanation. She reconciled the abuse
she received and her assaulter's liberty by appeals to Jesus who would make sure
each got her or his just rewards. Regardless of her faith that justice would pre-
vail, she was suffering all the classic symptoms of the rape trauma syndrone.
One last example conveying the "real" nature of voodoo to believers involves
Betty and Monica. Both are in the 7th grade, come from poor families, and are
not well supervised. Each earns spending money by working as prostitutes for
Mammy Belch. Regardless of the economic motive, their values, and what to them,
is the excitement of being "working girls," both Betty and Monica explain their
involvement through voodoo. Mammy Belch runs a combined "voodoo parlor" and house
of prostitution in a rundown residential neighborhood. Clients can buy herbs,
cures, potions, powers, and sexual services all under one roof. The girls claim
that Mammy Belch puts a hex on them--by giving them the evil eye-in order to make
them prostitute themselves and, not incidentally, takes most of the money for their
services. It is not so much a matter of making them perform sexually as it is fear
of what will happen if they don't. It is said this entrepreneur controls the
neighborhood because of her voodoo ability. People are afraid that if they don't
shape up in the direction Mammy Belch wants them to, they will be the recipients
of the supernatural funneled through her.
Reactions
Many of us dismiss voodoo as a scam or con game. Although we don't know
whether or not all voodoo practitioners are sincere, most assume that they are
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not. In part, this is sheer ethnocentrism. In addition, most of us are not
knowledgeable enough about another belief system to see how one event might fit
into an entire system of thought. Leesa, partly as a lark, partly serious, went
to have her palm read. Sister Turin mentioned a number of possible interpretations
of Leesa's future. Because the palmist had been so accurate about her past, she
was willing to believe that the predictions of the future had the same probability
of veracity. Because some of the possibilities involved misfortune, Leesa became
very concerned. Sister Turin told her that she could have some control over future
events--that they were not inevitable. One alternative mentioned was the buying
of powers which Leesa could use to protect herself. Being very concerned about
what might happen, Leesa wrote a check for $150.00. A little distance and kidding
from her mother and friends made Leesa conclude that she had been had. She put a
stop order on her check and felt lucky to have escaped the clutches of this schem-
ing woman who was willing to take her money and obviously was unable to give her
anything in return. She was outraged that she almost had been conned (and possibly
a little sheepish that she had allowed things to go so far).
Leesa's interpretation of voodoo is probably not that different from those in
positions requiring them to deal with voodoo believers: basically, they don't
believe in it. This fact is well known by believers who are, consequently, unwill-
ing to reveal the real situation. Mary, anticipating reactions of police,
religious counselors, welfare counselors, and abortion counselors did not mention
voodoo in her contacts with various agencies. It was not until she was asked about
her own emotional well-being that she felt free enough to reveal what had made her
leave home and end as a rape victim.
Yvonne had approached two separate college counselors with the bare bones of
her problems with her family and their effect of her finances and ability to
concentrate. Both of the counselors, in making personal referrals to another
agency described her as bizarre; there were gaps in her story which was inter-
spersed with events which they assumed indicated she was unstable or lying.
Tweetie knew full well, from past experience, that her explanation of forced
sexual assault would not be believed by the police, nevertheless, proceeded with
calm religious assurance to relate her story to personnel at the hospital emergency
room. To her consternation, most of the nurses were not even polite. Police
officers and nurses openly exchanged giggles. The physician on duty was so dis-
dainful of her "story" that he dismissed her without even performing the
evidentiary examination required by law.
Betty and Monica attended school irregularly and when present were viewed as
creators of disturbance in classes and the halls. Officials involved with
delinquency cases had written them off incorrigible and assumed they had no decent
future. It was not until one teacher, acting on her hunch that fear was central
to the problem, approached the girls and uncovered the role of voodoo. Even then,
most counselors and police-officers dismissed the girls' report as either false or
silly.
Another instance related as typical, was uncovered in the realm of child
protection. The case of a young girl, a victim of incest, was under review by a
team faced with three alternatives: return the child to the home of victimization;
place her in a foster home; or send her to her grandparents; respectable people
who had requested custody of their grandchild. The most logical choice, the
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latter was rejected because the grand parents believed in protective amulets and
spells.
Indepth interviews with a psychiatric social worker who has considerable
experience in a range of institutions and agencies and is highly thought of in
the local therapeutic community revealed a consistent pattern; client/patients
being observed or examined for indications of mental illness were uniformly
classified as mentally ill if they expressed a belief in voodoo. In systematic
recall, she noted that no other independent means of diagnosing was used. In
instances she detailed, belief in voodoo was seen, in the circular manner so often
used, as both a symptom and a form of mental illness.
One last example will suffice. The author, upon being invited to attend a
meeting of the staff of a local mental health agency, was bombarded with questions
requiring that she clearly define the religious parameters of voodoo (and
legitimate them) and distinguish them from delusions indicative of mental illness.
My rather hurried reply was to use Rosenhan's example of hallucinations.
Thus, I may hallucinate because I am sleeping,
or I may hallucinate because I have ingested a
peculiar drug. These are termed sleep induced
hallucinations, or dreams, and drug-induced
hallucinations, respectively. But when the
stimuli to my hallucinations are unknown,
that is called craziness, or schizophrenia-
as if that inference were somehow as illuminat-
ing as the others. (1973:255).
One cynical member of the staff made the analogy to fundamentalists Christians and
the difficulty the staff had in dealing with them when their numbers began to grow.
More specifically, I noted the degree to which persons in powerful positions now
openly related their conversations with God. In the past, conversing with the
supernatural was considered prima facie evidence of mental disturbance, now it is
used as the basis for legislation and public policy.
Analysis
The variety of views of voodoo indicated above points to the relativity of
reality. Whether or not an event is thought to be true and to what degree is
dependent upon the interpretation of the event. There is not an automatic
response, rather we are forced to assign some kind of meaning to the event. Attach-
ing the term voodoo to an event allows us to make it understandable. Whether or
not our interpretation of an event is valid is irrelevant in the cosmic scheme of
things. What is relevant is that we need to comprehend it; to make it fit into
our conception of reality. The usefulness of voodoo to its believers is summed up
on Malinowsky's words:
Looking from far and above, from our high
places of safety in the developed civilization,
it is easy to see all the crudity and irrelevance
of magic. But without its power and guidance
early man (sic) could not have mastered difficulties
as he has done, nor could man have advanced to
the higher stages of civilization (1948:70).
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The tongue-in-cheek view of nonbelievers is obvious. That definitions of reality
are arbitrary and subjective rather than objective observations should be clear
at this point: different people viewing the same phenomenon see it as different
things. Yet, recognition of relativity is not enough for the researcher, tile
theoretician, or the practitioner. Given our reliance upon determinism, there
must be some order and order which, hopefully, can be perceived. At this point, a
reminder of epidemiology as a clue to understanding is relevant. How this relates
to voodoo might be better illustrated by analogy than preached.
Most data in the mental field indicate that the poor, minorities, and urban
residents have higher rates of psychological problems (Faris and Dunham, 1938;
Hollingshead and Redlich, 1958; Rushing, 1964; Srole, et al., 1975). In addition,
Blacks have a high incidence of psychoses (Scott, 1958) and women disproportionate-
ly experience depression (Redick, 1974; Chesler, 1972). That there are two
acceptable models of explanation for distribution has already been noted. The
first states that those with high rates experience more of the cause. The reader
will have no problem understanding that a belief in voodoo is not evenly spread
throughout the population; that one's heritage and environment would be strong
influences on belief. However, when we shift focus and remember that a belief in
voodoo is often the basis for diagnosing mental illness, the second or interpretive
model comes to the fore.
The one pattern noted above which has been most adequately studied is that of
women, however, it can be assumed that similar research on other categories would
result in findings bolstering the interpretive model. The classic research is
that of Broverman, et al (1970) in which clinicians were asked to describe a
healthy adult, a healthy male, and a healthy female. There was general agreement
among the respondent for all three. Their description of a healthy adult and a
healthy male were very similar, however, a healthy female was described in very
different terms. It is clear that what occurs is not an objective assessment of
one's mental health, rather the process involves interpretation, a subjective
phenomenon. The healthy woman or man is expected to be one who fulfills the
stereotyped conception of their sex. Healthy women are seen to differ from
healthy men by being more submissive, less independent, less adventurous, more
easily influenced, less aggressive, less competitive, more excitable in minor
crises, having their feelings more easily hurt, being more emotional, more
conceited about their appearance, less objective and disliking math and science.
Clearly "woman" and "adult" are seen as mutually exclusive. Women are in the
position of choosing to exhibit those positive characteristics considered
desirable for healthy adults and males and being considered unfeminine and un-
healthy, or to behave in a feminine fashiong which might be in conflict with the
personalities and personal wishes of many women. This double bind for women might
increase the actual rate of mental illness for that category. From the definition-
al point of view, women who do not exhibit traditional traits are more susceptible to
being defined as mentally ill. It follows that defining a person who views the
world differently or who does not fulfill the expectations of the diagnostician is
likewise susceptible of being categorized as mentally ill.
Conclusion
Nonbelievers can and often will pass off voodoo as rubbish, foolishness, or
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mental illness. For the mental health practicioner, however, the situation is
more complicated. A clinician is in a position of authority. At the very least
she/he has the power to label one well or ill. At the extreme, a practitioner
can influence life events as important as involuntary admission to a mental
hospital. It is because of the power of the position that the practitioner must
be aware that her or his own view of the world is not the only one and not
necessarily the correct one. By putting oneself in the place of the other or by
participating in mental relativizing the therapist is better able to be fair to
clients.
Recognition of the role of beliefs in cause, cure, and perception of illness
is slowly but surely coming about (Press, 1977; Rubel, 1977; Webb, 1971).
Religious practitioners from the Caribbean community in Miami are available to
help Western physicians in hospitals. Seminars and conferences, though still rare,
are more frequently informing mental health practitioners and social service
personnel of the strength of belief systems and the degree to which the
"establishment" should recognize, rather than dismiss them.
To indicate the existence of multiple realities certainly does not help to
solve all problems for mental health and social service practitioners. It may
interject a healthy dose of cynicism to realize that one may be as unfair in
classifying as mentally ill one who believes in voodoo as one who believes in
Christianity. Yet, basic questions remain. My personal choice of professional
tactics is to begin by viewing world perspectives or ideologies as irrelevant to a
diagnosis. It would appear necessary for a clinician to migrate into the world of
the client before diagnosing and developing a direction for therapy. After this
migration has taken place, standard criteria can be applied. If my goal as a
counselor is to alleviate the pain felt by a client then I will proceed different-
ly than one who feels that their goal is to bring a client into closer touch with
reality. The extent to which a client's behavior, as opposed to cognitive
structure, is my concern would also determine the use made of knowledge about
relative realities. Obviously, the acceptance of the reality, to the holder, of
different kinds of knowledge and beliefs is a first step in dealing with many of
the philosophical issues confronting professionals.
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